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31 INTRODUCTION 
To  avoid  a  relapse  into  protectionism,  should  the  major  industrial 
economies--the  United  States,  the Western European  bloc,  and  Japan--seek 
better aligned  and  more  stable exchange  rates?  Their  enormous  trade  in 
goods  and  services,  and  rapid· integration of previously insulated 
national  financ.ial  markets,  would  seem  to  require a  common  monetary 
standard.  Otherwise,  enterprises in any  one  nation are  continually 
subject  to  c.apricious,  and  what  is perceived  to  be  unfair,  changes  in 
their international  competitiveness. 
But  what  prevents  the  three major  industrial blocs  fron 
coordinating  their p.olicie.s  to secure exchange  stability?  Al thoueh  many 
people  would  point  to political differences,  I  shall argue  that 
doctrinal disputes  among  economists are more  important.  Well 
intentioned politicians and  government  officials are  stymied  because  of 
·the  differing theoretical  perspectives  of their economic  ad~isors. 
First is the  question of whether  or not  foreign  exchange  risk can 
be  effectively hedged  in financial  and  forward  exchange  markets--and 
thus  whether  or not  international monetary  reform is even  necessary. 
Secondly,  after a  d.ecade  and  half of unremitting turbulence  in the 
foreign  exchanges,  economists  cannot  agree  on  what  are  "equilibrium"  or 
desirable  target levels  for .exchange  ·rates if they  were  to be 
stabilized.  Two  separate and  contending  princi·ples--that of purchasing --2-
power  parity or of balanced  trade--give very different estimates  for  ~he 
optimum  yen/dollar or mark/dollar rates of .exchange  in 1986. 
Thirdly, if nations  can  agree_ on  exchange-rate  targets,  there  is 
disagreement- over  how  national monetary  policies  should  be  coordinated 
to achieve  them. 
Let  us  consider each  issue in turn. 
Exchange  lluctuations,  Pinancial Innovation and  Capital Mobility 
Over  the  past  decade  and  a  half,  how  volatile were  exchange  rates 
among  the  three  major  blocs?  Major  peak-to-trough movements  in  the  u.s. 
dollar since  1970  are  presented  in Table  1--although it doesn't  capture 
day-to-day or month-to-month volatility.  The  larger percentage  changes 
in the dollar/mark and  dollar/yen exchange  r~tes in  the  two  right hand 
columns  of Table  1  show  the  extraordinary degree  of interbloc 
movement.  More  generally,  people  agree  on  the  f.ollowing  stylized  facts: 
(1)  Relative  to.  profit margins  on  investment  measured  in any  Ott~ 
national  currency,  interbloc  exchange  rate changes  hav.e  been  very 
large.  One  percent  in a  day,  five  percent in a  month,  and  20  percent  in 
a  year are  commonplace  [IMF,  1984]. 
(2)  Exchange  fluctuations  have  been  mainly  unanticipated  by  the 
market,  reflected neither in  exante  interest differentials across 
countries nor  in  forward  premia  or discounts  in  the  exchange  markets 
[Frenkel  and  Mussa,  1980]. 
(3)  These  changes  have  been~  in the  sense  that domestic 
prices  have  remained  relatively sticky.  Among  these  industrial 
countries,  large cyclical fluctuations  in exchange  rates  have  not  been T
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offset by  the  much  smaller,  largely secular,  differences  in domestic 
price inflation [Levich,  1985]. 
(4)  Despite  the  free  flow  of financial  capital,  large but 
variable "real" interest diff.erentials of up  to  three  or four  percentage 
points between  similar assets  denominated  in different currencies are 
commonplace  [Frankel,  1986]. 
In  response  to  this turbulence in  the  foreign  exchanges,  financial 
markets  in  Chicago,  New  York,  London,  Frankfurt,  Tokyo  and  so  on  have 
developed  an  amazing  range  of financial  devices  for hedging  both 
exchange  and  interest rate risk.  In order to  relieve  some  of the 
currency stress on  manufacturers  and  merchants,  a  swarm  of young  MBAs 
find  gainful  employment  in providing  innovative  forms  of  forward  and 
futures  contracts,  options  to  buy  or sell foreign  exchange,  currency or 
interest rate  swaps  and  so  forth.  Since  the late 1960s,  the  massive 
growth  of interbank trading in  the  Eurocurrency markets has  allowed 
banks  to more  easily cover net  foreign  exchange  risk arising out of such 
"retail"  transactions  with their nonbank  customers. 
" ••• innovation  has  improved  the. efficiency of international 
financial  markets,  mainly  by  offering a  broader and  more  flexible  range 
of instruments both  for  borrowing  and  for  hedging  interest rate  and 
exchange  rate  exposures.  These  changes  have  clearly aided  banks  and 
their customers  to  cope  with  stresses associated  with  the  greater 
volatility of exchange  and  interest rates in recent years". 
[Bank  for  International Settlements  (BIS),  1986,  page  1] -5-
Only  if private  financial specialists may  freely  take  positions in 
foreign  exchange  though  unrestricted capital movement,  however,  can 
forward  hedging help merchants better cope  with  exchange  and  interest 
rate risk [McKinnon,  1979].  For  example,  consider  the  final  but  long-
delayed  emergence  in the  1980s  of the  Japanese  yen  as  a  major  currency 
for  invoicing  foreign  trade and  international banking  transactions. 
Previously existing Japanese  exchange  controls and  interest  rate 
restrictions in the  Tokyo  capital market  had  unduly  hampered  the 
development  of forward  exchange,  swap,  and  options  markets 
--thus greatly reducing  the yen's international usefulness. 
Now  in  the  mid  1980s,  however,  capital mobility  among  the  three 
major  blocs  is unrestricted,  and  there are  no  artificial restraints on 
innovative  new  forward  contracts--and  other financial  devices--for 
hedging  against exchange  risk. 
Market  Failure in Hedging Exchange  Risk 
After  glancing at the  dazzling array of new  financial  instrume~ts, 
most  economists  might  rest comfortably assured  that most,  if not  all, 
international  currency  risk associated with  trade  and  investment  could 
be  effectively hedged.  Nevertheless,  merchants  and  international 
investors still find  they have  substantial residual  exchange  risk which 
cannot  be  hedged  as  long as  exchange  rates are  free  to  fluctuate.  Why 
the  paradox? 
In purely domestic  trade within a  single currency area,  we  know 
that a  manufacturer  cum  investor cannot  make  all his  investment  an~ 
production decisions at time  zero--and  then lay off  the  economic  risks -6-
with a  complete  set forward  contracts  contingent  on  various  uncertain 
states of nature.  Arrow  and  Debreu  [1973  and  1959]  have  taught  us  that, 
in practice,  fo.rward  markets  for goods  and  services are  seriously 
incomplete  in a  capftalist economy.  Thus  a ·producer must  simply  live 
with  the  fact  that his  future sales,  output,  and  supply  purchases  remain 
somewhat  uncertain.  However,  this uncertainty is easier  to bear if the 
real  purchasing  power  of domestic  money  is stable.  Then  he  can  carry 
liquidity forward  to  cover unexpected  contingencies,  and  he  needn't 
worry  about  arbitrary valuation changes  in the  monetary  standard 
themselves  leading  to  intertemporal  relative  price changes  between  his 
inputs  and  outputs. 
In international  (interbloc)  commerce,  by  contrast,  this 
fundamental  price  and  out.put  .uncertainty is greatly exacerbated when 
"nature"  includes  continual  sharp changes  in exchange  rates.  Forward 
markets  in  foreign  exchange  cannot  be  effectively utilized  by  expor~!f~ 
or  importers  who  are  unable  to  contract  forward  in commodity  markets. 
Only  if an  exporter can  forward  sell all his  goods  for  foreign money, 
can  he  effectively "double  hedge"  by  taking  out  a  forward  foreign 
exchange  contract to get  safely back  i~to his home  currency [Kawai  and 
Zilcha,  1986].  But  double  hedging  is only feasible-for a  small 
proportion of the  potential future  flow  of international commerce--
confined  mainly  to  the  near  term  of a  few  months  to  a  year.  In effect, 
the  fundamental  Arrow-Debreu  (empirical)  conundrum  of incomplete  forward 
commodity  markets  leaves merchants  and  international  investors .exposed 
to  foreign  exchange  risk which  they  cannot  avoid! -7-
For  example,  when  the dollar was  generally weak  in  the  1970s,  and 
became  substantially undervalued  from  1977  to 1980,  American  tradable 
goods  industries  looked  profitable and  "excessive"  investments  occurred 
in certain kinds of mining  and  manufacturing--with  agriculture also 
becoming  overcapitalized.  As  the dollar  (unexpectedly)  rose  in 1981  and 
be-came  overvalued  until mid  1985,  these  industri~s th_en  suffered a  big 
shakeout  with.  bankruptcies  and  plant closures.  The  resulting avalanche 
of prote_ctionist  sentiment  in the  u.s.  Congress  is. still with  us--even 
though  by  1986  the dollar is no  longer overvalued. 
Similarly,  as  the yen  has  risen incredibly  from  260  yen/dollar in 
March  1985  to  below  160  yen/dollar in mid  1986,  Japanese  industrial 
output  has  turned  down  and  much  of her  previously  installed 
manufacturinB  capacity has -suddenly  become  unprofitable.  ~iis  ha~ 
prompted  Japan's  preeminent  industrialist,  Mr.  Akio  Morita,  Preside_nt  of. 
the  Sony  Corporation,  to call for  reforms  such  that national  money 
becomes  "a  common  scale of va_lue  internationally rather than  just 
another speculative  commodity"  [Morfta,  1986].  Otherwise,  he  can't 
properly decide  on  what  kinds  o_f  goods  in which  to  invest,  in ·which 
country  to  produce  them,  or how  to  arrange  for  future  sales  and 
supplies. 
In summary,  how  well  do  floating  rates  (without  exchange  co.ntrols} 
approximate  having  a  single international money  across  our  three  major 
blocs? 
As  a  means  of payment,  the  elaborate interbank market  in foreign 
exchange  is cheap  and  efficient for  spot and  forward  payments  seve~al -8-
months  hence.  From  this narrow  perspective of transactions  efficiency, 
not much  is lost by  ndthaving a  single international money. 
In  providing a  stable unit of account  (or standard  of deferred 
payment)  for  investments,  however,  the  floating rate system  has 
performed  poorly  [Kindleberger,  1985].  Without  a  common  (and  stable) 
standard of value  in the  longer run,  the efficiency of investment--both 
intrabloc  and  interbloc--has declined. 
Two  Views  of the  "Equilibrium"  Exchange Bate 
The  landmark  accord at  the  Plaza  Hotel  in New  York  on  September 
22,  1985  among  the  Group  of five  (Britain,  France,  Germany,  Japan  and 
the  United  States)  finally  recognized  the  need  for official action  to 
secure  exchange  stability.  When  the  dollar was  grossly overvalued  in 
the  early  1980s  peaking  out at 260  yen/dollar and  3·7  D.M./dollar in 
February  1985,  people  generally agreed  that action should  be  taken  to 
bring  the  dollar down.  In addition to  (modest)  official foreign 
exchange  intervention in September  and  October  1985  to sell dollars  for 
marks  and  yen,  u.s.  money  growth  expanded  in 1985  relative  to  that  in 
Germany  and  Japan--see  the  lower  panel  of Figure  1.  The  dollar  came 
down--see  Figures  2  and  3--and international monetary  coordination 
seemed  to  be  working. 
But  then,  in 1986,  monetary  cooperation appeared  to fall apart. 
Despite  some  coordinated  cuts in discount rates early in the  year,  in 
April  of 1986,  the  u.s.  Federal  Reserve  system  failed  to  support  the 
Bundesbank  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  in their intervention  to  prop  the 
dollar up--after it had  fallen  to  170  yen  and  2.2 marks.  Subsequently Dollar 
WPI 
Ml 
-9-
FIGURE  1 
DOLLAR  ..  PRICES  AND  MONEY  SUPPLIES 
JANUARY  1985-JULY.1986,  RATES  OF  CHANGE  OVER  THE  YEAR 
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(September  1986),  the dollar fell significantly further--particularly 
against  the yen--with  some  evident acrimony among  the  three  central 
banks  as  to  what  should  be  their exchange  rate  targets. 
For example,  in 1986,  newspaper  surveys of  Japanese  entrepreneurs 
frequently  find  200-220  yen  to  the  dollar to  be  the  rate consistent with 
their long  run normal  profits.  McKinnon  [1984]  regards  200  yen  as  the 
right yen/dollar rate.  The  Japanese  government  seems  willing  to 
tolerate 170-1-80  yen;  while  the u.s.  government  seems  inclined  to  push 
the  yen  higher  than  that.  Williamson  [1986]  estimates  the  proper  rate 
to  be  162,  and  an  even  higher yen  is regarded  as desirable  by  Bernstein 
[1986]  and  Krause  [1986],  whose  estimates  are  120  and  100,  respectively. 
Clearly,  this difference of opinion is of major  importance  in 
determining  what  u.s.  monetary  policy should  be,  and  how  it should  be 
coordinated  with  those of the  European  and  Japanese  central  banks.  It 
is not  mainly due  to  statistical discrepancies  or differentj.al access  to 
information.  Rather this difference is rooted  in  two  separate theories 
of what  the  exchange  rate is expected  to  accomplish: 
(1)  Purchasing Power  Parity  (PPP).  Official exchange  rate 
targets  should  be  set to  align national  price  levels  so  that  the  real 
purchasing  power  of money,  say  one  dollar, is roughly  the  same  in  terms 
of internationally tradable  goods  in each  country.  Monetary  policies 
should  be  coordinated  so  that  this  common  price  level is stable--without 
significant inflation or deflation being  imposed  on  any  one  of the 
trading partners. (3) 
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(2)  Balanced  Multilateral  Trade  (BT).  The  exchange  rate  should 
be  set to  roughly  balance  the  flows  of imports  and  exports of any  one 
country--allowing for  the need  to make  interest payments  and  other debt-
service  requirements,  and  for  "small"  new  net capital  flows.  Net  trade 
flows  are dominated  by  relative prices at home  and  abroad  as  determined 
and  potentially controlle.d by  the  exchange  rate. 
The  differences  b.etween  these  two  approaches  to  target  ting 
exchange  rates are  quite  fundamental. 
The  PPP  criterion looks at the  exchange  rate  as  simply  an 
extension of domestic  monetary  policy,  where  the  primary  obligation of 
the  central bank  is to  stabilize  the  domestic  and  international 
purchasing  power  of tne  domestic  money.  (1)  says  nothing  about  what  the 
net  trade  balance  should  be,  although maintaining  PPP  at a  steady level 
would  itself tend  to  minimize  the  probability of there being  any  undue 
or precipitate change  in a  count.ry' s  international  competitiveness. 
Whether there is a trade  surplus  or deficit when  PPP  is satisfied, 
however,  is outside  the  model  and  depends  on  the  saving-investment 
balance  in  the  economy. 
The  balanced  trade criterion under  (2)  shows  no  explicit  concern 
for  the  state of inflation or deflation across  traaing partners,  or  for 
the  price  level  targets of the  central  bank.  The  exchange  rate is seen 
more  to  be  an  adjunct  of commercial  policy,  like tariffs and  quotes,  in 
maintaining  international competitiveness--as defined  by  the  net  trade 
balance  itself. - 14-
Problems  with  the Balanced Trade Criterion 
This  focus  on  the net  balance in commodity  trade  arose  in  the 
theoretical literature of the  19,0s  and  1950s  and  is sometimes  called 
the  "elasticities" appro.ach  to  international  payments.  At  that  time, 
countries  with  trade deficits had  to  worry  about  protecting official 
exchange  reserves  because  the  private international captial market  was 
moribund,  and  one  could  not  expect balancing.capital  inflows.  Then  too, 
countries  were  not  sufficiently integrated in foreign  trade  for  exchange 
rate  changes  to  have  much  effect on  their domestic  price levels.  Hence, 
by  affecting relative prices at home  and  abroad,  the  exchange  rate was 
assigned  to  balance  international  commodity  trade. 
The  BT  criterion implies  that "equilibrium"  exchange  rates will 
change  continually in response  to  nonmonetary  disturbances.  For 
example,  the  recent fall in the  price of oil has  benefited  the  Japanese 
trade balance  much  more  than  the  American.  This  has  prompted  .some 
analysts  [Williamson,  1985  and  1986]  to  lower  their estimates  of  the 
equilibrium yen/dollar  exchange  rate.  (Whereas  under  the  PPP  approach, 
the  exchange  rate  would  be  invariant  to  worldwide  changes  in  the  price 
of oil or  any  other commodity.) 
Most  importantly,  the  BT  approach  to  the  exchange  rate  is 
logically incomplete.  It says  nothing about  the  saving-investment 
imbalance  in  the  dome.stic  economy  which  must  be  changed  if a  devaluation 
is  to  have  the  conventional effect of improving  the  trade balance.  At 
the  present  time,  for  example,  the  huge  u.s.  Federal  budget  deficit is 
creating a  shortage of saving in the American  economy  which  is being met -15-
by  borrowing  abroad--thus  making  a  trade deficit inevitable.  If capital 
inflows  and  the  trade deficit were  both  curtailed arbitrarily,  u.s.  real 
interest rates  would  have  to  jump  sharply  to curtail American 
absorption--perhaps  causing a  slump  in investment. 
Similarly,  there is no  predictable effect of "real"  exchange  rate 
changes  on  the  trade  balance  among  open  economies  where  capital  flows 
freely.  For example,  no  exchange  rate exists that would  balance u.s. 
foreign  trade with  an_ongoing  fiscal deficit of  200  billion dollars  a 
year.  In  the  intermediate  run,  a  devaluation of the  dollar could  have 
the  unconventional  effect of worsening  the u.s.  trade  balance  and 
increasing  Japanese  surplus.  If the  overvalued  yen  causes  a  profit 
squeeze  and  business  slump  in  Japan  with declining imports,  conceivably 
Japan's  trade  surplus  could  get bigger  even  .though  her  exports  are  now 
more  highly priced  in world  markets. 
Nevertheless,  analysts  who  wish  to  push  the  dollar down  further 
usually have  the  (ambiguous)  BT  criterion in mind. 
Vhy  Purchasing Power  Parity? 
Because  the  BT  criterion is deficient,  and  because  the  Japane.se 
and  American  economies  are  now  so  integrated in flows  of commodities  and 
financial  capital,  I  claim that that  purchasing  power  par.ity is the 
(only)  correct criterion for  judging  the  appropriate  equilibrium  level 
for  the  yen/dollar  exchange  rate  (and,  of course,  the dollar's 
equilibrium exchange  rates  with  European  currencies.)  Only  the  PPP 
criterion for  setting  the  exchange  rate  is consistent  with  the  idea of 
coordinating national  monetary  policies  so  as  to  approximate  having  a -16-
single  intern~tional money  across  the  industrial economies--having  "a 
common  scale of value"  in Mr.  Morita's  words. 
If PPP  is satisfied,  by  definition each national money  will have 
the  same  purchasing power  over a  common  broad  basket of tradable  goods 
and  services.  True,  discrepancies in the  prices of nontradable  goods 
and  services would  remain:  rental pri.ces  on  land ·or  wage  costs  could 
vary significantly fro.m  one  country to another--just as  they  now  vary 
interregionally within a  single country.  Compare  the  south of Italy to 
the north at the  present  time,  or the  relatively low  cost  of labor 
and/and  in the  southern United  States  for  almost a  century after the 
American  Civil War.  In contrast  to  floating exchange  rates,  however, 
a  stable  exchange-rate  regime  prevents  the  prices of a  broad  basket of 
tradable  goods  in  Country A from  arbitrarily changing  in comparison  to 
similar  tradable gooqs  in Country  B. 
Macroeconomic  stability is a  second  important  reason  for  using  the 
PPP  criterion for  targetting exchange  rates.  If,  exchange  rates  vary 
randomly  and  unexpectly as  they do  under  floating,  the.n  departures  from 
PPP  could  cause  sudden deflation or inflation within any  one  country. 
For  example,  the  rapid  appre.ciat.ion  o.f  sterling in 19.79,  when  1 t  was  a 
"petrocurrency",  imposed  sudden deflation and  unemployment  on  the 
British economy;  and  the  recent rapid appreciation of the  yen,  raising 
Japanese  prices  price above  those in the  rest of the world,  is imposing 
undue  deflation in Japanese  manufacturing--see  Figures  2 and  3.  In 1986, 
the  surprisingly devaluations of the  New  Zealand  and  Australian dollars over  the  past year and  a  half is causing unwanted  inflations in those 
economies. 
In summary,  ·the  PPP  criterion for setting exchange  rates is 
preferred:  (1)  to  provide a  uniform.  standard  of value  for  international 
investments  and,  (2)  to minimize  the  likelihood of sharply and 
une%pectedly different rates of inflation in individual countries.  {The 
.still open  question of how  to control worldwide  inflation or deflation 
is considered  below.) 
Jleasuring Purcbasi.ng Power  Pari  V 
Even  if one  accepts PPP  in principle,  and  central bank$rs  agree  to 
bend  national monetary  policies  towards  a.chieving it, how  can  one 
accurately estimate  today•s  PPP  exchange  rates?  After all,  for  the  past 
decade  and  a  half of unrestricted floating,  exchange  rates have 
fluctuated  wildly relative to national price levels. 
As  yet,  no  international secretariat publishes a  broad  ind.ex  of 
tradable  goods  prices--with common  quantity weights--that is then  used 
to  establish  the  price level  for  Japan  in yen  comparable  to  that  for  the 
u.s.  in dollars comparable  to  that for  Germany  in marks.  If such  cross-
country price indicies  existed,  "absolute"  PPP  ·exchange  rates could  be 
precisely calculated:  those  rates at which  ~ne dollar would  have 
exactly the  same  purchasing  power  in all three  countries at any  point  i.n 
time.  In practice,  however,  each country calculates its own  wholesale 
price  index  (WPI)  using different weights  and  price  relatives which  are 
not directly comparable. 
Thus,  one  has  to  use  various  approximations.  Cassel  (1922) -18-
introduced  the  familar method  of relative  ~urchasing power  parity 
assuming  knowledge  of a  single base year where  PPP  initially held,  and 
then deflating by  subsequent  national rates of price inflation. 
McKinnon  (1984)  used  this technique by  choosing 1975-76  as the  base 
year,  and  then deflating with  subsequent  changes  in relative unit  labor 
costs  (Figure 4).  He  estima·ted  PPP  to  be  210  yen  to  the dollar at the 
end  of 1983--projected  to be  200  yen  in 1"986;  and  estimated  the  PPP 
DM/dollar  rate  to be  2.00 for late 1983, .projected  to be  2.1  'DM/dollar 
in 1986. 
But  how  can  one  have  confidence that ·these  crude  estimates  are 
close  to  being  correct?  F.r.om  the modern  asset approach  to  exchange  rate 
determination [Frenkel  and  Mussa,  1980],  we  know  t.hat  exchange  rates are 
"forward  looking"  variables.  From  this one  can  plaus.ibly infer that 
exchange  rates behave  as if they  lead  or  cause  {in the  Granger  Sense) 
tradable ,goods  prices.  This  suggests a  sui  table  test for  any  estimate 
of the  true  PPP  exchange  rate. 
For  example,  co~sider my  est~mate of 200  as  PPP  for  the  yen/dollar 
rate.  If the  yen  apprecia  tea.  below  200  yen  per dollar,  Japanese 
tradable  goods  prices  {WPI)  should fall  ~elative to  the  American  WPI. 
And  Figure  2  shows  this effect rather .dramatically.·  Since  the  end  of 
1985,  Japanese  tradable  good  prices have  begun  to  fall sharply  relative 
to their American  counterparts.  B,y  July  1986  at  160  yen/doller,  the 
Japanese  WPI  had  fallen 8  percent more  than  the  American  WPI  from  e  year 
' 
earlier.  Japanese  industrial goods  price  in yen  are  now  falling at the 
rate of about  10  percent per year.  In September,  1986  at  153 FIGURE  4 
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yen/dollar,  the  yen  is grossly overvalued. 
In contrast,  Figure 3'shows  that  the  German  mark,  currently 2.05 
D.M.,  is not significantly different  from  its PPP  level.  In  1986,  the 
German  and  American  WPie  are  (slowly) .declining at about  the  same 
rates.  Hence,  I  infer that  the  dollar is not significantly undervalued 
with  respect  to  the  European  bloc of currencies. 
Kenichi  Ohno  (1986)  has  made  similar PPP  exchanee-rate 
calculations much  more  precisely by  explicitly inco.rporating  the  eff'ect 
on  relative price levels of deviations  from  PPP--assuming  that unit 
labor costs also  affect relative price movements  in both  countries.  His 
new  ''price-pressure approach"  for measuring  PPP  exchange  rates  avoids 
having  to  assume  some  base  year in which  PPP  held--and  incorporates 
statistical information  from  all exchange  rate  and  price-level data 
since  1975. 
For  1985  and  1986,  Ohno's  path  for  PPP  exchange  rates is given  by 
the  dashed  lines  in Figures  2  and  3  respectively.  Currently,  his 
estimates  for  PPP  are close  to  210  yen/dollar and  2  .• 1  DM/dollar. 
Looking  at the  fall in the  Japanese  price. level relative  to  that of  the 
u.s.  and  Germany,  he  also  concludes  that  the  yen  is greatly overvalued 
relative  to  the dollar and  European  currencies. 
From  this,  however,  one  cannot  predict that  the  yen  is likely to 
fall into a  better exchange  rate alignment.  In the  absence  of 
systematic  international monetarycoadination,  we  know  that  exchange 
rates will continue  to  fluctuate  randomly  and,  thus,  unpredictably. -21-
El-ents in the llonetarz Accord 
Once  governments  in the  three major  blocs agree  on  a  consistent 
set of PPP  targets,  international negotiations  to stabilize exchange 
rates within a  narrow  range  are necessary and  desirable.  At  the  same 
time,  the  triumvirate  would  anchor  the  common  price level by  agreeing  to 
aim  for zero  inflation in a  common  basket of internationally tradable 
goods.  Elsewhere,  I  have  analyzed  [McKinnon  1984  and  1.985]  in some 
detail how  such monetary  coordination could  be  affected  on  a  step-by-
step basis.  Here  let me  briefly stress the  key  features  on  which  the 
Bundesbank  (representing  the  European  bloc),  the  Bank  of Japan,  and  the 
u.s.  Federal  Reserve  System  should  agree. 
(i)  That  target .zones  for  exchange  rates be  officially 
established.  Initially,  fairly broad  10  percent bands--sey,  keeping  the 
dollar between  190  and  210  yen,  and  between  2.1  to 2.; marks--could  be 
formally  announced.  As  international mon-etary  coordination successfully· 
evolves,  these  bands  could be  significantly narrowed  at a  later stage. 
(ii)  that  the  three central banks  agree  to mutual  and  symmetrical 
monetary  adjustment  to achieve  these exchange  rate targets.  That 
country whose  currency is relatively overvalued  would  expand  its money 
growth  rate  above  normal  and  reduce  money-market  rates of interest. 
~ereas those  countries  whose  currencies were  undervalued  would  reduce 
their money  growth  below  normal  and  raise interest rates. 
Although  mutual  monetary  adjustment  under  (ii) is the  necessary 
driving force  for  the  new  agreement  to  be  credible,.  the  annou."lcement 
effect under  (i) is extremely  important  for allowing  private -22-
expectations  coalesce  around  the  newly  announced  official exchange  rate 
targets. 
With  private expectations successfully eupportins  the  official 
actions,  relatively little actual monetary  adjustment  would  be 
necessary.  Indeed,  one  might  have  gotten away  with less mutual  monetary 
adjustment  in 1985--of rapid growth  in the u.s.  and  quite slow  growth  in 
Japan--if the  triumvirate had  announced  exchange  rate  targets. 
(iii)  That  "normal"  money  growth  rates in the  three  countries be 
chosen  so  as  to  stabilize the  common  price level  in internationally 
tradeable  goods.  If international deflation threatened  (as is often 
heralded  by  a  decline  in primary  products  prices),  the  three  would 
jointly expand  their money  growth--and vice versa when  inflatio.nary 
pressure developed. 
At  the  p,resent .time  (September  1986).,  for  example,  the  unusual 
weakne·ss  in world  commodity  prices  suggests  that  joint money  growth  in 
the  triumvirate  should  be  greater than normal.  But  the  weakness  in  the 
u.s.  dollar against  the yen  and  ~ark suggests  that this incremental 
growth  be  concentrated  in Japan  and~to a  lesser extent,  in Europe. 
Once  exchange  rates are  properly aligned  (according to  PPP),  the 
three  central banks  should  meet  continually ·to  monitor  the  behavior of 
the  common  price  level  in internationally tradable goods.  In this 
respect,  an  international secretariat  (associated  with  the  Monetery 
Accord)  could  help by  developing a  common  price  index with  fixed  weights 
reflecting the  importance  of goods  produced  in Europe,  Ja.pan  and  the 
u.s.  (A  similar proposal has  been  made  by  Pentti  Kouri  in the  context of -23-
the  ~Shadow" Group  of  ~ven (G-7)  [1986]).  Collective money  growth 
would  be  increased if this index  showed  deflation--and decreased if it 
abow•d  international inflation. 
Each  participating central bank  would  also use  this international 
index aa  own  internal price level  target.  For  example,  the  Bundesbank 
would  uae  the mark  value  of the  international WPl  as its target for 
~aero" domestic  price inna.tion·--rather than using  the  German  GNP 
deflator or CPI  or some  other such  index.  The  Federal  Reserve  System 
aDd  Bank  of Japan  could  adopt  similar internal targets based  on  changes 
in the dollar and  yen  values of the international WPI. 
Use  of such a  common  price index would  then  ensure  that  the 
domestic  price-level targets of each .central bank  are fully  consis·tent 
with  exchange-rate stability based  on.  purchasing  power ,parity.  In  the 
mean  time  when  no  such  international index is available,  the  triumvirate 
could  rely on  existing national WPis  to get approximate .estimates of 
whether  international prices  of tradable goods  were  rising .or  falling. 
B,y  these  techniques,  international monetary  policy would  be 
assisned  to maintaining a  stable international  standard of value,  while 
avoiding cycles of inflation and  deflation of the  k'ind  experienced  ov.er. 
the past  15  years of floating  exchange  rates--and  described  in  the 
Appe~dix. -24-
Appendix:  T.he  International Business  Cycle  Under 
Fixed  and  Floating  EX.change  Rites 
Many  readers will be  concerned  that the  three  central banks  are  . 
giving up  too  much  monetary  autonomy  in order to  establish a  common 
international monetary  standard.  Indeed,  a  supposed  advantage  of 
floati~ exchange  rates  was  that each  country would  have  greater 
effective autonomy  in macroeconomic  management. 
How  well has  this independence  in the  conduct  of monetary  policy 
served  the  United  States,  and  other countries,  in the  1970s  and  1980s? 
Using  the  fixed  exchange  rate  period  of the  1950s  and  1960s  as  a 
benchmark  for  comparison,  Ohno  [1986]  summarizes  the  collective 
macroeconomic  performance  of the eight  principal industrial  economies 
over  the  past  decade  and  a  half of floating  thus: 
(1)  trend  rates of domestic  price inflation tend  to  be  higher  in 
each  of the  eight  countries  (Table  2),  while 
(2)  trends  in real  GNP  growth  are all much  lower;  and 
fluctuations in prices and  output around  these  trends are 
more  synchronized  across  countries  (Figures  5 and  6). 
Nobody  denies  that the  macroeconomic  performance  of the  industrial 
economies  has  become  distinctly worse  since  the earl' 1970s.  More 
surprising perhaps  is the  stronger positive correlation in output 
fluctuations  across national boundaries--the synchronization and  ·mutual 
reinforcement of the  real business  cycle--in moving  from  fixed  to 
floating  exchange  rates.  But,  using more  or less sophisticated 
statistical techniques,  several researchers have  established  the  greater -25-
Table  2 
Trenda!l in Inflation and  Real  GRP  Growth  Under  Fixed  and 
Floating Exchange  Bates:  Eight  Industrial Countries 
(annualized  percentage change  in quarterly data) 
GHP  Deflator  Real  GHP 
fixeiY  ·floa11/  fixe~  floa..J./ 
u·.  s.  2.8  6.5  ,.,  2.9 
Japan  4·5  5·2  9·4  4-6 
Germany  3·3  4.6  5·3  2.1 
Canada  2-7  a.o  4-7  3·3 
U.  K.  ,.a  11.6  2.6  1.5 
France  4·2  9-2  5-6  2.7 
Italy  3·7  13-5  5·3  2.2 
Betherlands  4·4  6.,  4.6  2-4 
Simple  Means  .3•7  a.f  5-1  2-7 
(B  countries) 
Source:  IMF  International Financial Statistics 
1J  Period means  for each  country. 
]/  Pixed  Exchange  Rates  from  1956.1  to  1971.2. 
~  Floating Exchange  Rates  from  1971.3  to 1985.1. -26-
FIGURES  S-6 
Source: 
~: 
United State• 
Japan 
Gemany 
Canac!a 
l~nited linadom 
France 
Italy 
Natbarlancla 
Figures  S and  6 are taken  from Kenichi Ohno  "Iatemational 
Synchronization of Inflation and Ileal Activity'' Feb.  1986 • 
Stanford University. 
The  underlying trends  from  which  the deviationa in Figur••  S 
and  6  were  calculated are provided in Table 2. • 
•• 
• 
-27 ~ 
FIGURE  6 
bal·CDrPI  :  Deviation frca trend 
<a>  P_is.S lacbut• late Period 
(b)  Ploating lacbant• late Perior! 
•  "  •  •  "  •  •  •  ••  •  - Source  and  Legend:  See  Ohno  Op.  cit. 
_,, 
..  ..  •  " -~-
synchronization and  severity of ·macroeconomic  fluctuations  in the  mo.re 
recent  period. 
Clearly,  the  high  degree of synchronization in the  international 
business cycle suggests  that it is best dealt with  collective~y-­
providing  that  the  goals  of the  three major  central banks  are narrowly 
specified in terms  of price-level stability.  Most  importantly,  in order 
to  avoid  the  sudden  inflations or deflations characteristic of the 
floating-rate  period,  u.s.  monetary  policy should  be  better 
internationalized.  T.he  asymmetric  behavior of u.s.  money  growth  with 
respect  to  other industrial countries--as  shown  in Figure 7  and  Table  3-
-has  been  a  major  source  of cyclical instability in the  world  economy. 
But  that is a  story  for  another  time  [McKinnon,  1984  and  1985]. -29-
'l'able  3 
Contemporaneous  Correlation 1D  M0ne7  Qrovth  and  Ch&Dgea 
1n the  Dollar lxchuce late Uncler· Ploatiq:  1971 :III - 1985:1 
Dollar  u.s.  aone7 
Dollar  1.00 
-o.04 
lOY  aoner  -0.62" 
1  •. 00 
-o.o,  1.00 
Source: 
Botea: 
Kenichi  OhDo  "International Synchronisation of Inflation and 
leal Act1vit7•  lebruar,r,  1986,  Stanford  Univerait7. 
"Dollar•  ia quarterlJ ch&DCea  1D  IMP's  "mara•  weighted  index 
ot the clollar e%chaqe rate qainat 17  other industrial 
countries.  It is ver.y  similar (but not  identical)  to  the 
inde%  shown  111  the second  colwm ot Table  1. 
•u.s.  mone1•  ia quarterlY ,rowth iD  u.s.  M1. 
"lOY  110ner•  refers to the  niahted average  ( uaiJ1B  tued GIP 
veipta tor 19i7) ot 111  sroyth in the  rest ot the  industrial 
world:  Japan,  GermaDJ,  Canada,  United  Kingdom,  Prance, 
Ital7 &Dd  the  letherlanda. 
The  table Shows  within-quarter correlation coefficients 
amona  the rates of chanse  ot eaCh  variable.  All  data are 
emoothe4  with a  four quarter moviDg  average. 
", •  and I  mean  aignificance at th• 1  %,  ~  and  1  O%  level, 
reapect1vel1• 
The  aisnificant negative correlation between  dollar and  ROW 
moner  also holds  for unamoothed  data. -30-
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F.-. 7. 
Note:  For definitions of  ROW  money  and dollar 
exchange  Tate,  aee Table 3. -31-
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